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EIGHTH CIRCUIT EXTENDS McCARRAN-FERGUSON TO
SHIELD ALLEGED MONOPOLIZATION OF THE
HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY FROM
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
[Health Care Equalization Committee v. Iowa Medical Society, 501 F.
Supp. 970 (S.D. Iowa 1980), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1020
(8th Cir. 1988)]
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the Committee on Quackery, a committee of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, proposed to target Iowa for a pilot project.,
In 1967, a member of the committee delivered a speech in Iowa. In
addition, a slide show, prepared by a member of the Committee on
Quackery, was shown in Iowa. 2 The goals of the Committee on
Quackery were the containment and the ultimate elimination of
chiropractic. 3
The Iowa Chiropractic Society picked up the gauntlet. The Health
Care Equalization Committee, a committee of the Iowa Chiropractic
Society, sued fourteen defendants, including the American Medical
Association, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa, the Iowa Medical
Society, and individual physicians.4 The Health Care Equalization
Committee (Committee) alleged the defendants violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 5 Specifically, the Committee
claimed that the defendants had conspired to eliminate or prevent
the growth of the chiropractic profession through a group boycott or
concerted refusal to deal with chiropractors.6 In addition, the Com-
mittee alleged that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa (BCBS) con-
spired to monopolize, attempted to monopolize, and monopolized
1. Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970,
983 (S.D. Iowa 1980), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1988).
2. Id.
3. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 213 (7th Cir. 1983). The
Committee on Quackery was established by a vote of the AMA Board of Trustees in
November of 1963, and was active until 1974. Id. In December of 1966, the AMA
House of Delegates adopted a resolution asserting that chiropractic is an unscientific
cult whose practitioners lack the necessary training and background to diagnose and
treat human disease. Id. This resolution was supported by the AMA Committee on
Quackery and the AMA Board of Trustees. Id.
4. Iowa Medical, 501 F. Supp. at 975.
5. See infra notes 83-132 and accompanying text, discussing this case in detail.
6. Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1022
(8th Cir. 1988).
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the health care insurance business in Iowa. 7
The federal district court for the southern district of Iowa held
that the Committee did have standing to bring the antitrust claims.8
The district court dismissed the claims against BCBS, holding that
the state action doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted
BCBS from scrutiny for antitrust violations.9 The Committee ap-
pealed the dismissal of the actions against BCBS. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holdings.IOThis Comment will briefly re-
count the history of antitrust law and of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The origins and development of the state action doctrine, as it re-
lates to antitrust law, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act will be dis-
cussed in detail. The Eighth Circuit's application of these doctrines
to relieve BCBS from liability for alleged antitrust violations will be
examined. In addition, an alternative analysis of the case will be
presented.
I. HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Common Law
The history of antitrust law extends at least as far back as the fif-
teenth century."I The common law of antitrust developed along two
branches: one that discouraged restraint of trade, and one which
prohibited monopolies.' 2 Although the economic theories that are
the basis for antitrust law are beyond the scope of this Comment,'3
the goal of antitrust law can be summarized as the efficient allocation
of resources.14 Stated simplistically, antitrust law rests on the prem-
ise that if one supplier controls the market for a particular good or
service, he will be able to charge an unreasonably high price for his
7. Id.
8. Iowa Medical, 501 F. Supp. at 977-79.
9. Id. at 991, 995.
10. Id. at 1027, 1029.
11. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 156-57 (1977). Sulli-
van mentions Dyer's Case, Y.B. Pasch. 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pi. 26 (1414), as the traditional
starting point for a study of antitrust law. In that case a master tried to collect on a
bond for John Dyer's breach of his agreement not to practice his craft of dyeing in
the town for one half of a year. The court refused to allow collection on the bond.
Id.
12. Dyer's case, discussed in footnote 11, is an example of a case concerned with
restraint of trade. Sullivan traces the history of monopoly cases to Darcy v. Allein, 77
Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602). Queen Elizabeth I granted Darcey, her groom, the ex-
clusive right to import playing cards into England. When Allein made and sold play-
ing cards, Darcey sued to stop Allein. A unanimous court held that Darcey's
monopoly was void and dismissed the suit. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 157-58.
13. Gellhorn provides an explanation of the relationship between antitrust law
and economics that even an economic illiterate can understand. See E. GELLHORN,
ANTITRUST AW AND EcONOMICS IN A NUT SHELL (3d ed. 1986).
14. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 2.
[Vol. 15
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/8
HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY
product or deliver a product of inferior quality, and the consumer
will have no recourse. Competition is viewed as the primary means
to keep prices down, quality up, and prevent any one supplier from
controlling a market.'5
The inadequacy of the protection provided by the common law
became apparent in the United States with the construction of the
railroads.16 Because railroads were expensive to build, and access to
land in populated areas was limited, the railroads were free from
competition in many areas of the country.' 7 The public was con-
cerned that the railroads were abusing their monopoly power.' 8 In
addition, trade abuses by the Standard Oil company and other
"trusts" in the second half of the nineteenth century, made it clear
that the common law was not sufficient to protect the consumer.' 9
Legislation on a national scale was needed to address the interstate
activities of the large trusts.20
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act
In response to growing public concern, Congress passed the Sher-
man Antitrust Act of 1890.21 Section 1 of the Act proscribes restric-
tive trade agreements, including boycotts.22 Section 2 of the Act
15. See id at 2-3.
16. E. GELLHORN, supra note 13, at 15-16.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 16. Specifically, the public thought the railroads discriminated
among shippers when setting rates. There was also concern that railroads tried to
eliminate competitors by artificially inflating their rates in areas of the country where
they had a monopoly so they could undercut prices on competitive routes. Id. at
16-18, n.2.
19. See W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 54-59 (1980). The
trusts were a legal innovation created by Standard's attorneys. Id. at 55. The trusts
allowed competitors to combine their companies and be managed by a central board
of trustees. The trusts were condemned by the public for the predatory tactics they
used to obtain monopolies. For example, it was alleged that Standard Oil drove the
price of kerosene far below cost in isolated areas of the country until all the competi-
tors had been forced out of business. Standard Oil would then raise the price of
kerosene way above the previous market level and enjoy monopoly profits. See E.
GELLHORN, supra note 13, at 16-18.
20. See W. LETWIN, supra note 19, at 68. Several states had passed statutes to deal
with abuse of trade by the railroads, but the statutes proved ineffective for interstate
commerce. Id.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
22. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act currently reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Provided, Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
1989]
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outlaws monopolies.23 These two sections of the Act were an at-
tempt by Congress to codify the existing common law of antitrust.24
However, the penalty associated with antitrust activity was changed.
In contrast to the common law, which merely refused to enforce anti-
competitive contracts, the Sherman Act made trade restraint and
monopolization punishable as crimes.2 5
It is important to realize that the Sherman Antitrust Act is not an
absolute prohibition against restraint of trade or formation of mo-
nopolies. Congress' authority to promulgate the Act is based on the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.26 Therefore, the Act applies
only to activities which can be characterized as interstate or foreign
commerce. 27 In addition, exceptions to the Act have been carved
out by judicial interpretation, and subsequent legislation.2 8 Two
such exceptions are the state action doctrine and the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act.29
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1989).
23. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act currently reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (West Supp. 1989).
24. Senator Sherman, the author of the Act, told Congress that the Act "does not
announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of
the common law." 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890).
25. Currently, violations of Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act are felo-
nies punishable by a fine of up to one million dollars, up to three years imprison-
ment, or both. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (West Supp. 1989).
26. The commerce clause states that Congress shall have power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art I, section 8, cl. 3.
27. Originally, the Sherman Antitrust Act was in danger of being rendered inef-
fective by the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of interstate commerce. See
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (Court refused to apply the
Sherman Act to the sugar trust, holding that the law did not extend to manufacture of
products).
28. For example, labor unions are allowed to monopolize the labor supply to
negotiate for better wages and working conditions without violating the Sherman
Antitrust Act. See Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932; Clayton Act of 1914; United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469
(1940).
29. The state action doctrine is discussed infra in notes 30-49 and accompanying
text. The McCarran-Ferguson Act is discussed infra in notes 50-83 and accompany-
ing text.
[Vol. 15
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/8
HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY
C. The State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine is a judicially created exception to the
Sherman Antitrust Act. It is based on concerns of federalism, and
can be traced to Parker v. Brown.30 In that case, Brown, a raisin
farmer, brought suit to restrain the Agricultural Department of Cali-
fornia from enforcing the Agricultural Prorate Act of 1940.31 The
object of the Act was to restrict competition among growers and
maintain prices in the distribution of produce.32 The stated purpose
of the Act was to conserve the agricultural wealth of the state and to
prevent economic waste in the marketing of crops.33 The Act di-
vided the state into production zones. It became effective only after
65% of the producers within the zone consented.34 Brown claimed
the California Act violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.35 The
Supreme Court of the United States disagreed:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its his-
tory which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attrib-
uted to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state.3
6
Although the Court's opinion suggests that a state can exempt any
activity from antitrust scrutiny by enacting appropriate legislation, it
should not be interpreted so broadly. Later in the opinion the Court
cautioned: "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
30. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
31. Id. at 344,
32. Id. at 346.
33. Id.
34. More specifically, the statute was written so that the petition of ten producers
within a defined zone for a particular crop would start the process of bringing that
zone under the control of the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission. After the
petition was filed, the statute required a public hearing, and a showing that the insti-
tution of a program for the proposed zone would further the goals of the Act before
the Commission could grant the petition. After a plan for the zone was prepared, it
would not go into effect unless 65% of the producers in the zone, owning at least
51% of the acreage in the zone devoted to that crop, consented to the plan. Id. at
346-7.
35. Id. at 344.
36. Id. at 350-51.
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their action is lawful."37 Ever since Parker, the courts have struggled
with identifying the factors that must be present for a practice to fall
under the protection of the state action doctrine.3 8
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court set out a two-pronged
test to determine when the anti-competitive conduct of private par-
ties should be deemed state action.30 In California Retail Liquor Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,40 a wholesale wine producer
challenged a California statute that prevented wholesalers from sell-
ing wine at a price less than the one stated in an effective fair trade
contract or an effective price schedule.41 The Supreme Court noted
that the threshold question was whether or not the California statute
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.42 The Court held that the stat-
ute constituted an illegal restraint of trade because it was a plan for
resale price maintenance.43 Then the Court went on to consider
whether California's involvement in the price maintenance program
was sufficient to establish antitrust immunity under Parker.44
The Supreme Court determined that in order for the state action
doctrine to protect the challenged activity from antitrust liability, two
standards must be met.45 First, the activity must be "clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and second, "the
policy must be actively supervised by the state itself."46 The Court
held that the price maintenance scheme in Midcal satisfied the first
prong of the state action doctrine test. 47 The scheme, however,
37. Id. at 351 (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332,
344-47 (1904)).
38. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976) (state's par-
ticipation in the decision to have a light bulb exchange program is not so dominant
that it is unfair to hold the electric company responsible for the decision); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (for conduct to be protected by the state
action doctrine it must be compelled by the state); Sound Inc. v. American Tel. and
Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1334 (8th Cir. 1980) (four factors to consider in applying
the state action exemption are the existence and nature of any statutorily expressed
policy; the nature of the regulatory agency's interpretation and application of its en-
abling statute; the fairness of subjecting a regulated private defendant to the antitrust
law; and the extent of the state's interest in the specific subject matter of the chal-
lenged activity).
39. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
40. Id.
41. ld. at 99.
42. Id. at 102.
43. Id. at 103.
44. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
45. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
46. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978)).
47. Id. The first standard is satisfied because the legislative policy clearly permits
resale price maintenance. Id.
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failed to satisfy the second prong:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices
nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it
regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not mon-
itor the market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamina-
tion" of the program.48
Holding that the price maintenance program was a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court stated, "The national policy in
favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-
fixing arrangement."4
9
This two-pronged test continues to be used by the Supreme Court
in determining if challenged anti-competitive activity qualifies for im-
munity under the state action doctrine.50 The Supreme Court has
continued to define each prong. In Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conf.
v. United States,51 the Court held that an anti-competitive activity did
not have to be compelled by the state in order to meet the first prong
of the test.5 2 In Patrick v. Burget,5 3 the Supreme Court stressed that
the active supervision prong requires that state officials have and ex-
ercise the power to review private parties' particular anti-competitive
acts and disapprove of those that do not comply with the state pol-
icy.54 Although the state action doctrine is still undergoing defini-
tion, it appears to be the model of stability when compared to
interpretations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
D. The McCarran-Ferguson Act
The McCarran-Ferguson Act is a legislatively promulgated excep-
tion to the Sherman Antitrust Act.55 It exempts certain practices of
insurance companies from antitrust liability.56 When the Sherman
Antitrust Act was passed, the common law did not consider issuing
insurance policies to be part of interstate commerce.57 However, in
48. Id. at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 106.
50. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy,
107 S. Ct. 720 (1987); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985).
51. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
52. Id. at 62.
53. 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
54. Id. at 1663-64.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
57. The leading case standing for the premise that issuing insurance policies is
not a commercial transaction is Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
19891
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United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. ,58 the Supreme Court
held that insurance companies were engaged in interstate
commerce. 59
In South-Eastern Underwriters, a private association of fire insurance
companies was being prosecuted under sections I and 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. The member companies controlled ninety per-
cent of the fire insurance market in the six states where the
conspiracies were successful. The companies fixed premium rates
and agents' commissions. They employed boycotts, coercion, and
intimidation to force nonmember companies into the conspiracies as
well as trying to compel people to purchase insurance only from as-
sociation companies. 60 The companies tried to defend their behav-
ior on the grounds that Congress did not intend the Sherman
Antitrust Act to be applied to insurance transactions.61 The
Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the association was subject
to the Sherman Antitrust Act.
62
Congress was concerned that the Court's decision in South-Eastern
Underwriters might be interpreted to mean that state regulation and
taxation of insurance companies was unconstitutional.63 In re-
sponse, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act the next
year.6 4 The Act exempts the "business of insurance" from antitrust
scrutiny if the activity is regulated by the state and is not in the form
of a boycott.6 5 While determining what constitutes a boycott within
the meaning of the Act has presented some difficulties,66 the primary
58. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
59. Id. at 539.
60. Id. at 535-36.
61. Id. at 553.
62. Id.
63. Within one year of South-Eastern Underwriters, court actions had been filed in
eleven states challenging tax laws, and in thirty-one states taxes were paid under
protest. Weller, The Mccarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance. Language,
History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 591 (1978).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945). See infra note 65 for portions of the text of
the statute.
65. The relevant portions of section 10 12(b) currently read:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That afterJune
30, 1948, the Act ofJuly 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act,
... shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by state law.
Id. (emphasis added).
Section 1013(b) provides, "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or
act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Id.
66. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1979), four insur-
ance companies agreed that three of the companies would refuse to sell insurance to
[Vol. 15
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challenge for the courts was to define the "business of insurance."67
In Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co. ,68 the Supreme
Court applied the McCarran-Ferguson Act to a new type of insur-
ance company. In Royal Drug, several pharmacies that did not have a
contract with Blue Shield alleged that Blue Shield and several of its
participating pharmacies violated antitrust laws. 69 Specifically, the
non-participating pharmacies claimed that Blue Shield and the par-
ticipating pharmacies entered into agreements to fix the retail price
of drugs, and these agreements caused Blue Shield's customers to
boycott the non-participating pharmacies.70 Blue Shield sought to
invoke the protection of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, claiming that
its contracts with the pharmacies were the "business of insurance."71
The Court noted that at the time the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
passed, corporations organized to provide health care plans were not
customers of the fourth company, so that the fourth company could force its custom-
ers to accept new policy terms. The customers sued the insurance companies for
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 533. The insurance companies claimed
that they were protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The companies argued that
the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be narrowly construed
to include only boycotts against competitors. Id. at 550-51. The Supreme Court
construed "boycott" more broadly, and held that the insurance companies were not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 552-53. The Court explicitly refused to ad-
dress whether the companies would have been exempt if the boycott could have been
classified as state action. Id. at 554-55.
67. In Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.
65 (1959), the Supreme Court held that annuity contracts sold by insurance compa-
nies were not the "business of insurance" because they placed all the risk on the
buyer and none on the company. Id. at 71. A variable annuity policy is one where
the insured is paid periodically, in varying amounts, depending upon the success of
the investments of the insurance company. BLACK'S LAw Dic'rioNRtY 83 (5th ed.
1979). The Court based this holding on the premise that the concept of insurance
requires some spreading of the risk from the buyer to the company. Variable Annuity,
359 U.S. at 71. The distinction between the insurance business and the "business of
insurance" was reinforced in Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). In National Securities, the Supreme Court, in deciding the
applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to state law, stated:
The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the activities
of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or companies who are
subject .to state regulation, but to laws "regulating the business of insurance." Insur-
ance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount federal regula-
tion; only when they are engaged in the "business of insurance" does the statute
apply. Id. at 459-60 (emphasis in original). The Court determined that the core of
the "business of insurance" involved "the relationship between insurer and insured,
the type of policy which could be issued, [and] its reliability, interpretation, and en-
forcement. -. " Id. at 460.
68. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id.
71. Id.
1989]
9
MaloneyHuss: Eighth Circuit Extends McCarran-Ferguson to Shield Alleged Monopo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
considered to be in the insurance business.7 2 The Court also ob-
served that companies such as Blue Shield incur two types of obliga-
tions: subscriber contracts, between Blue Shield and its customers,
which insure against the risk that the policyholders would be unable
to pay for health care during the period of coverage, and provider
contracts, between Blue Shield and the participating pharmacies,
which serve to minimize the cost Blue Shield incurs in fulfilling its
subscriber contracts. 73 The Supreme Court held that the provider
contracts were not the "business of insurance."74
In reaching this decision, the Court observed that the provider
contracts did not involve underwriting risks.75 The Court noted fur-
ther that protection of insurance companies which cooperate in un-
derwriting risks was one of the primary reasons the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was passed. 76 If cost reduction alone were enough to
make an agreement the "business of insurance," then almost all con-
tracts entered into by insurance companies would be exempt from
antitrust law.77 The Court supported its holding by noting that ex-
emptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed.7 8 In
addition, the Court observed that the McCarran-Ferguson Act ex-
empted the "business of insurance" and not the "business of insur-
ance companies" from the antitrust laws.
79
Following its decision in Royal Drug, the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted the "business of insurance" exemption from the Sher-
man Antitrust Act in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno.80 In Pireno, a
chiropractor claimed that an insurance company's use of a peer re-
view board to recommend customary and reasonable charges for
medical care violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.8l The
claim alleged that the review board constituted a conspiracy to fix
prices.8 2 The insurance company argued that the peer review board
was an essential component of risk spreading, because it determined
the extent of the insurance company's liability to the insured.83 The
Court rejected this argument, however, and stated that the "peer re-
view arrangement [was] logically and temporarily unconnected to
72. Id. at 226.
73. Id. at 213.
74. Id. at 232-33.
75. Id. at 214.
76. Id. at 221.
77. Id. at 232-33.
78. Id. at 231.
79. Id. at 232-33.
80. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
81. Id. at 123.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 130.
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the transfer of risk... ."84 Thus, the Court held that the peer review
board did not qualify as the "business of insurance."85
Following Royal Drug,8 6 the Court began its analysis by identifying
three factors to consider in determining whether a challenged activ-
ity is the "business of insurance." 87 Although no one factor is deter-
minative, the important factors are as follows: whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship be-
tween the insurer and the insured; and whether the practice is lim-
ited to entities within the insurance industry.88
As previously mentioned, the Court determined that the review
board was completely unrelated to the spreading of risk.89 In addi-
tion, the peer review board was found not to be an integral part of
the relationship between the insurer and insured.90 Finally, the
Court resolved the third factor in favor of Pireno by recognizing that
the peer review committee involved entities wholly outside the insur-
ance industry.91
The Pireno factors represent the current test for determining
whether a particular practice qualifies as the "business of insurance"
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This is a difficult test to apply,
and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals used it in determining if the
practices of BCBS were exempt from antitrust scrutiny in Health Care
Equalization Comm. of the Iowa Chiropractic Soc'y v. Iowa Medical Soc'y.92
The court of appeals' task was complicated by BCBS also claiming
exemption from antitrust liability based on the state action doctrine.
There is little case law concerning defendants who claim to be ex-
empt from antitrust laws based on both the state action doctrine and
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.93 The interaction of these two exemp-
84. Id.
85. Id at 134.
86. Id. at 129.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 130.
90. Id. at 131.
91. Id. at 132.
92. 851 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1988).
93. In addition to the case that is the topic of this Note, this writer's research has
uncovered only two other cases dealing with both of these exemptions: Ratino v.
Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1265 (4th Cir. 1983) and Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543
F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (4th Cir. 1976).
In Ratino, a physician appealed from the granting of an insurance company's
motions for summary judgment. The physician had challenged the use of a "usual,
customary and reasonable" insurance plan to govern reimbursements to doctors as
violative of antitrust law. The district court granted the insurance company's mo-
tions for summary judgment on the grounds that the plan was exempt from antitrust
scrutiny under the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the state action doctrine. Id. The
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tions makes this case an interesting one to study.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The District Court Proceedings
When the Health Care Equalization Committee of the Iowa Chiro-
practic Society (Committee) brought the antitrust claim in the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Iowa, fourteen defendants
were named, including Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa. 94 The
Committee, as assignee of the claims of 120 Iowa chiropractors,
charged that the defendants had conspired in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act to eliminate or prevent the growth of
the chiropractic profession.95 The Committee alleged that the de-
fendants boycotted chiropractors by:
(1) refus[ing] to permit medical doctors to refer patients to chiro-
practors, to accept patient referrals from chiropractors, or to treat
patients in cooperation with chiropractors; (2) deny[ing chiroprac-
tors] access to hospitals and hospital services; (3) attempt[ing] to
block accreditation of chiropractic educational institutions;
(4) promot[ing] ... public statements critical of chiropractors; and
(5) refus[ing] to include coverage for chiropractic services in health
care service plans.
9 6
The Committee also alleged that BCBS violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act by conspiring to monopolize, attempting to monopo-
lize, and monopolizing the health care insurance business in Iowa.97
Specifically, the Committee alleged that BCBS had "taken over cov-
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court on both of these issues.
Id. at 1265.
In Ballard, chiropractors appealed from the dismissal of their antitrust action
against insurance companies for failure to provide chiropractic coverage. Ballard,
543 F.2d at 1077. The district court dismissed the actions based on the grounds that
the insurance companies were protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the state
action doctrine. Id. at 1078-79. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court on both grounds. Id.
94. Iowa Medical, at 1022. The original list of defendants is as follows: the Iowa
Medical Society; the American Medical Association; Blue Cross of Iowa and Blue
Shield of Iowa; the American Hospital Association; the Iowa Hospital Association;
the American College of Radiology; the joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals; Norman L. Pawlewski (the Iowa Commissioner of Health); Joseph Sabatier, Jr.,
M.D.; Donald C. Young, M.D.; Nelson H. Chesney, M.D.; Clarence R. Denser, Jr.,
M.D.; and H. Doyl Taylor. Id. at 1022, n.2.
95. Id. at 1022. The Committee also brought claims under the Iowa common law
of tort and the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, these claims
are not addressed in the Eighth Circuit decision. In 1986, the district court granted
the Committee's motion to dismiss its tortious interference claim and entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of all defendants on the federal civil rights claim. The Com-
mittee did not appeal from those orders. Id. n.3.
96. Id. at 1022.
97. Id.
[Vol. 15
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/8
HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY
erage of groups of patients previously afforded third party coverage
... by private insurers, thereby creating an economic bias favoring
competing medical doctors, depriving the insured Iowans of a rea-
sonable election between chiropractic and medical health care, and
depriving [chiropractors] of patients and income."98
All of the defendants joined in a motion to dismiss based on the
grounds that the Committee lacked capacity and standing to assert
the antitrust claims.99 BCBS also filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that their activity was protected by the state action doctrine
and by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.100 The district court held that
the Committee did have standing to assert the claims of the individ-
ual chiropractors. 101 The district court, however, dismissed the anti-
trust claims against BCBS. It held that the state action doctrine and
the McCarran-Ferguson Act protected BCBS from liability for al-
leged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
respectively.102 The Committee appealed the dismissal of the anti-
trust claims against BCBS.103
B. The Court of Appeals Analysis
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged
Midcal test and determined that the exclusion of chiropractic cover-
age from the policies offered by BCBS qualified for the state action
exemption from antitrust scrutiny. Therefore, the court of appeals
98. Id. at 1027.
99. Iowa Medical, 501 F. Supp. at 975. The AMA, Dr. Sabatier, and the American
College of Radiology filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
improper venue. Id. at 980. The district court dismissed the claims against the
American College of Radiology, but denied the motions to dismiss the AMA and Dr.
Sabatier. Id. at 997.
100. Id. at 988. Norman Pawlewski, the Commissioner of Public Health for the
State of Iowa, also moved to dismiss on the grounds that his conduct was protected
by the state action doctrine. The court denied his motion. Id. at 991-93.
101. Id. at 979-80.
102. Id. at 988-95. For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see supra notes
36-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "business of insurance" ex-
emption, see supra notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
103. Iowa Medical, 851 F.2d at 1022. The Committee also appealed the dismissal
of the claims against the American College of Radiology. Id. at 1029. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
at 1031.
The Committee appealed from a summary judgment granted against it on Au-
gust 4, 1986, in favor of the Iowa Hospital Association. Id. at 1031. The circuit court
affirmed the summaryjudgment. Id. at 1032. The defendants cross-claimed from the
district court's holding that the Committee was capable of bringing the antitrust
claims. Id. at 1032 n.16. However, the circuit court never addressed this issue, be-
cause after ruling on all the issues raised by the Committee on appeal, there were no
defendants remaining. Id.
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affirmed the district court's dismissal of the boycott claim.104 The
court of appeals also affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization
claim against BCBS. It held that BCBS met the "business of insur-
ance" criteria set out in Pireno, and that BCBS was protected under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.105
1. State Action Doctrine
When the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the
state action doctrine protected BCBS from liability for a boycott of
chiropractors in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
the court noted that BCBS are non-profit health care service corpo-
rations, governed by Iowa Code Chapter 514.106 The court of ap-
peals applied the two-prong test for state action immunity that was
set out in Midcal.107
Applying the first prong of the Midcal test, the court of appeals
concluded that Iowa Code Chapter 514 reflected a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition with
regulation in the health care service industry.108 The court inter-
prets the language of Chapter 514.1 to find a state policy favoring
BCBS's refusal to include chiropractors in their health care plans.109
Chapter 514.1 of the Iowa Code authorized health care corporations
to provide four types of plans: a hospital service plan; a medical and
surgical plan; a pharmaceutical plan; and an optometric plan.10
Chiropractors were not listed among the qualified health care prov-
iders in the medical and surgical plan. Ill
In addition to the language of the statute, the court of appeals con-
sidered the legislative history of Chapter 514. Health care service
corporations were initially authorized to provide medical and surgi-
cal service plans to subscribers in 1945.112 The statute limited the
plans to the services of "physicians and surgeons, osteopathic physi-
cians, or osteopathic physicians and surgeons." 1' 3 Subsequently, a
104. Id. at 1032.
105. Id. at 1029.
106. Id. at 1023. BCBS organized under Iowa Code Chapters 504 and 504A. Id.
107. Id. at 1024. The Midcal case is discussed supra, in notes 39-49 and accompa-
nying text.
108. Id. at 1024-25.
109. Id. at 1025-26.
110. Id. at 1025 (quoting IOWA CODE § 514.1 (1945)).
111. Id. at 1025. The specific language of the statute was a medical and surgical
plan "whereby medical and surgical service may be provided at the expense of said
corporation, by duly licensed physicians and surgeons, dentists, podiatrists, osteo-
pathic physicians, or osteopathic physicians and surgeons, to subscribers under con-
tract, entitling each subscriber to medical and surgical service, as provided in said
contract." IOWA CODE § 514.1 (1945).
112. Id. (quoting 1945 Iowa Acts Ch. 209, section 1).
113. Id.
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series of services has been added: dental services were added in
1955;'14 podiatric services were added in 1965;115 pharmaceutical
services were added in 1967;116 optometric services were added in
1969; 117 and chiropractic services were finally included in 1986.118
The court of appeals concluded that the omission of chiropractic
coverage until 1986 directly suggested that the legislature intended
to prevent the participation of chiropractors in the health care ser-
vice corporations.119
The court of appeals supported this conclusion with interpreta-
tions of Chapter 514 by the Attorney General and the Governor of
Iowa. The Iowa Attorney General stated: "Being creatures of stat-
utes, service corporations under section 514.1 can contract for these
services only and only with those persons or entities listed in Chap-
ter 514."120 The Governor of Iowa wrote: "eligibility for [chiroprac-
tic] benefit under Chapter 514 is prevented as a matter of law. ' ' 121
Based on the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the
opinions of the Attorney General and the Governor, the court of ap-
peals held that the exclusion of chiropractors from coverage by the
BCBS was a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy of
the State of Iowa, therefore satisfying the first prong of the Midcal
test. ' 22
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that the second
prong of the Midcal test, which requires active state supervision, was
satisfied. The court of appeals supported this conclusion by lan-
guage in the statute that requires each corporation to report annu-
ally to the Commissioner of Insurance, and the requirement that the
Commissioner approve every contract entered into by the corpora-
tions, including the rates charged to the subscribers.123 On the basis
of the Commissioner's role and authority under the statute, the court
of appeals distinguished Midcal, 324 Liquor Corp., and Patrick, where
the Supreme Court found no active state supervision. 124 Concluding
114. Id. (quoting 1955 Iowa Acts Ch. 244, sec. 1).
115. Id. (quoting 1965 Iowa Acts Ch. 397, sec. 1).
116. Id. (quoting 1967 Iowa Acts Ch. 369, sec. 1).
117. Id. (quoting 1969 Iowa Acts Ch. 271, sec. 1).
118. Id. (quoting 1986 Iowa Acts Ch. 1180, sec. 3).
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Op. Att'y Gen. (March 31, 1979)).
121. Id. (quoting II Iowa Admin. Bull., No. 9, at 527 (1979)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1026-27. Iowa law provides that the contracts between a health care
service corporation and its subscribers are subject at all times to the approval of the
Iowa Commissioner of Insurance. IOWA CODE § 514.7 (1988). And the Commis-
sioner of Insurance has the same authority over contracts between health care service
corporations and participating providers. IOWA CODE § 514.8 (1988).
124. Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1027
(8th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of Midcal and Patrick, see supra notes 39-54, and
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that both prongs of the test were satisfied, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court, and held that the state action
doctrine protected BCBS from the claim that BCBS boycotted the
chiropractors in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 125
2. McCarran-Ferguson Act
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals next considered whether the
McCarran-Ferguson Act protected BCBS from a claim of monopoli-
zation under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 126 The court
stated that the McCarran-Ferguson Act removes from antitrust scru-
tiny all conduct which is part of the "business of insurance," regu-
lated by state law, and not in the form of coercion, intimidation, or
boycott.127 Although the monopolization claim can be broken down
into claims of monopolization of the health care provider market and
the health care insurance market, the court characterized the monop-
olization claim as primarily a challenge directed against the contrac-
tual relationship between BCBS and Iowa subscribers.128
To determine if the subscriber contracts were the "business of in-
surance," the court of appeals examined these contracts under the
three factors set out in Pireno.129 The court held that the first factor
was met, because the contracts clearly had the effect of transferring
or spreading a subscriber's risk.130 The second factor, requiring that
the challenged practice be an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insured and the insurers, was met because the "con-
tracts are the policy relationship between the insurer and in-
sured."' 3 ' The court of appeals also held that the third factor was
satisfied because the contracts "by definition, are limited to insur-
accompanying text. In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) the Supreme
Court examined a New York statute which required liquor retailers to charge at least
112 percent of the wholesalers' posted bottle price. The Court held that the practice
violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act as a price fixing scheme. The Court
also held that the state action doctrine did not protect the program because New
York did not monitor market conditions or engage in any pointed re-examination of
the program. Id. at -.
125. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d at 1027.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1028. For a discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see supra notes
55-65 and accompanying text.
128. Id. Specifically, the court said that the "[section 2] allegations are essentially
aimed at the contractual relationship between [BCBS] as insurers and their Iowa sub-
scribers as insureds." Id. For a discussion on the dual nature of the monopolization
claim, see infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
129. Id. For a discussion of Pireno, see supra, notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1029 (emphasis in original).
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ance entities." 3 2 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the challenged activity was the "business of insur-
ance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.133
Next, the court of appeals considered whether the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act requirement of regulation by the state was satisfied. 134
The court held that any monopolization conduct on the part of
BCBS was regulated by the state.13 5 It supported this conclusion by
using the language in sections 514.6 and 514.7 of the Iowa Code.136
These sections regulate the contracts between BCBS and their
subscribers. 37
The court of appeals decided that there was no boycott within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, because the Committee's
monopolization claim did not allege that BCBS acquired a monopoly
on the health care market by boycott, coercion, or intimidation.138
The court stated that the Committee did not allege that BCBS's
"boycott of the chiropractors was related to the alleged... monopo-
lization of the health care insurance market." 139 The court of appeals
concluded that the subscriber contracts were part of the "business of
insurance," were regulated by the state of Iowa, and were not ob-
tained by boycott. Therefore, the court held that the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act protected BCBS from any claim of monopolization under
section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 140
In a footnote to the opinion, the court of appeals conceded that
the Committee did allege that BCBS attempted and conspired with
their co-defendants to monopolize the health care provider market by
boycotting chiropractors.141 Arguably, this behavior would not be
protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. However, the court rea-
soned that since it had already determined that this boycott behavior
was protected by the state action doctrine for the section 1 Sherman
Antitrust Act claim, the boycott would also be protected by the state
action doctrine under a section 2 claim.14 2 Therefore, the Eighth
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a boycott within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, see supra notes 55-65 and the accompanying text.
139. Id. at 1029 n.l 1 (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 1029.
141. Id. at 1029 n.ll.
142. Id. The Court stated, "It seems to us unduly anomalous to suggest that Con-
gress, in a statute intended to exempt state-regulated insurance practices from the
antitrust laws, intended to subject to the antitrust laws conduct by insurance compa-
nies that would be exempt from scrutiny if engaged in by any other entity." Id. at
1027 n.10 (citation omitted).
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Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the monopolization claim against BCBS.143
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
Portions of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion are excel-
lent. However, the opinion as a whole suffers from a failure of the
court to unravel the tangle of issues presented by this case. The
court of appeals addressed only two issues in depth.144 Actually,
there are five issues that must be resolved before the Committee's
antitrust claims against BCBS can properly be dismissed. In deter-
mining whether to dismiss the section 1 Sherman Antitrust Act claim
against BCBS, it is valuable to consider whether the state action doc-
trine or the McCarran-Ferguson Act provide BCBS with immunity.
The section 2 Sherman Antitrust Act claim is concerned with the mo-
nopolization of two distinct markets, the health care provider market
and the health care subscriber market. One should consider whether
the McCarran-Ferguson Act or the state action doctrine relieve
BCBS of antitrust liability for monopolization of the health care in-
surance market. If these doctrines do not protect BCBS, the final
question is whether the Committee, a member of the provider mar-
ket, has a cause of action against BCBS for wrongfully monopolizing
the insurance market. Each of these issues will be addressed in the
following discussion.
A. The Section 1 Sherman Act Claim
In order to determine if BCBS were exempt from the boycott
claim, it is necessary to analyze the issue using both the state action
doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Initially, this seems
counter-intuitive, one would think a single exemption would be
enough to shield BCBS. However, the McCarran-Ferguson Act spe-
cifically refuses antitrust protection for insurance companies en-
gaged in certain boycott activities. If the McCarran-Ferguson Act
applies to BCBS's boycott, the Act might impose antitrust liability
where the state action doctrine would offer immunity for the same
conduct. 145 Therefore, it is dangerous to decide that the practices of
BCBS were exempt from antitrust liability for the boycott claim with-
143. Id. at 1027, 1029.
144. The court only considered whether the state action doctrine protected BCBS
from the boycott claim, and whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act protected BCBS
from the monopolization claim. See supra notes 104-143 and accompanying text.
145. The Supreme Court has declined to decide whether the state action doctrine
or the McCarran-Ferguson Act would take precedence if the two were in conflict. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 554 n.27 (1978). For a discussion
of this case, see supra note 66.
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out considering both the state action doctrine and the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
1. Availability of State Action Doctrine Protection
The court of appeals' holding that the state action doctrine pro-
tects BCBS from antitrust liability for boycotting chiropractors in vi-
olation of section 1 of the Sherman Act is correct. The language of
Iowa Code Chapter 514.1, the legislative history, and the interpreta-
tions the Chapter by the state officials support a holding that the
state had a clearly articulated policy to exclude chiropractors from
participating in the health care service programs. BCBS could have
reasonably assumed that Chapter 514.1 required them to boycott the
chiropractors. Although compulsion is not required to satisfy the
first prong of the Midcal test,146 it is strong evidence of a state
policy. 147
The second prong of the Midcal test is also satisfied, because
Chapter 514 of the Iowa Code requires that BCBS report annually to
the Commissioner of Insurance.14 8 In addition, all the contracts en-
tered into by BCBS are subject to approval by the Commissioner of
Insurance."49 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the state
actively supervised the contents of the contracts, including the exclu-
sion of chiropractors. Both prongs of the Midcal test are met, there-
fore the state action doctrine did protect BCBS from the claim of
boycott in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
2. The Applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
The court of appeals did not address whether the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act protected BCBS from the Committee's boycott claim.150
Application of the Pireno factors to the boycott make it clear that the
boycott was not the "business of insurance." The boycott is not con-
nected to risk spreading. The risk of a back injury is spread when
BCBS agrees to insure against that health problem.151 The boycott
146. Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 66
(1985) (insurance companies' collective rate making activities were not held com-
pelled by the state, but were immune from antitrust liability under the state action
doctrine).
147. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45-46 (1985) (affirmatively expressed com-
pulsion may be the best evidence of state policy).
148. IowA CODE § 514.9 (1988).
149. IOwA CODE §§ 514.7, 514.8 (1988).
150. This situation is analogous to that in Royal Drug, where the Supreme Court
held that provider contracts with pharmacies were not the "business of insurance."
151. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Serv., 689 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1982)
(there is no evidence of risk-related reasons to distinguish between the services of
M.D.'s and the services of podiatrists for care of the foot); Virginia Academy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476, 483-84 (4th. Cir.
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of the chiropractors is not an integral part of the policy relationship
between BCBS and their insureds. The insureds are primarily con-
cerned with having their health care costs paid by BCBS. Therefore,
the types of illness covered by the policy are essential to the relation-
ship, while limitations on the providers is secondary.152 Finally, the
boycott involved entities wholly outside the insurance industry, the
chiropractors. Because the boycott did not satisfy any of the criteria
set out in Pireno, the boycott was not the "business of insurance."
The McCarran-Ferguson Act did not cover the alleged boycott by
BCBS.
As the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not apply to the boycott of the
chiropractors by BCBS, there was no potential for conflict between
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the state action doctrine.153 There-
fore, even though the court of appeals did not completely analyze
the issue, it correctly dismissed the section 1 Sherman Antitrust Act
claim against BCBS.
B. The Section 2 Sherman Act Claim
In considering the section 2 Sherman Act claim, it .is important to
distinguish between the two markets involved in this case. There was
a health care provider market, composed of doctors, chiropractors,
and other medical professionals. In addition, there was a health care
insurance market, made up of insurance companies who offered cov-
erage to subscribers. The Committee represented members of the
health care provider market. BCBS did not participate directly in the
health care provider market.
A claim that BCBS attempted to monopolize the health care pro-
vider market required a showing that BCBS engaged in unlawful be-
havior to unfairly aid health care providers in competing in the
provider market. The Committee attempted to show the unlawful
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (requiring psychologist to bill through a physi-
cian for the insureds to get reimbursed was not an underwriting decision). But see
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331, 1335 (10th Cir.
1986) (the choice of a provider is of the essence of that coverage bargained for as the
transferred risk).
152. Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743
(1985) (state statute requiring health care policies to include coverage for mental
illness was an integral part of the relationship between insurers and insureds) with
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1979) (limita-
tions on where insureds could fill prescriptions and have the cost reimbursed by the
insurer was not an essential part of the subscriber contract).
153. In Ballard v. Blue Shield of Southern West Virginia, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075,
1079 (1976), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with conflict between the
state action doctrine and the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The
court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act should govern, and that the insurance
companies were subject to liability for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id.
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activity through BCBS's boycott of the chiropractors in the health
care provider contracts. As discussed in the previous section, this
behavior was protected by the state action doctrine. Therefore, no
liability for a section 2 Sherman Act violation would attach to BCBS
for the boycott.
Alternatively, the Committee might be able to pursue a section 2
Sherman Act violation by showing that BCBS unlawfully monopo-
lized the health care insurance market, and that this monopoly
caused injury to the chiropractors in the health care provider market.
The theory of the claim is that BCBS is competing with private insur-
ers and for-profit insurers in the health care insurance market.
These other insurers are not governed by Iowa Code chapter 514
and are free to include chiropractors in their health insurance
plans.' 54 A complete analysis of this theory requires determining if
BCBS was protected from a claim of monopolization of the health
care insurance market by either the state action doctrine, or the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act. If BCBS were not protected from antitrust lia-
bility, then one must consider whether this claim gives the
Committee the right to bring an action against BCBS. 15 5
1. Monopolization of the Health Care Insurance Market
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered only the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act in determining if BCBS was shielded from anti-
trust liability for the section 2 Sherman Act claim. In a footnote, the
court stated, without a separate analysis, that the monopolization ac-
tivities of BCBS were protected by the state action doctrine.156 The
court's failure to conduct a separate Midcal analysis led to an im-
proper dismissal of the monopolization claim against BCBS.
a. Availability of State Action Doctrine Protection
Application of the two-pronged Midcal test shows that BCBS was
not protected from the monopolization claim by the state action doc-
trine.157 Chapter 514 of the Iowa Code may be evidence of a state
policy to displace competition with regulation in the health care in-
dustry, but it is not a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
policy favoring monopolization of the health care subscriber market.
154. Chapter 514 governs only corporations organized under chapter 504 (not for
pecuniary profit) and chapter 504A (nonprofit) for the purpose of providing non-
profit medical services. IowA CODE § 514.1 (1988).
155. The monopolization of the health care insurance market could in and of itself
be illegal activity, and subject BCBS to antitrust liability. However, in order to have
standing to bring the section 2 claim, the Committee must show that this monopoly
caused their members to be harmed.
156. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d at 1029 n. 11.
157. Midcal case is discussed supra in notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
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The majority of Chapter 514 regulates the terms of the provider and
subscriber contracts, the rates that can be charged, and the taxation
of the health care corporations. 158 Only section 514.14 arguably re-
lates to monopolization. It states, "[a]ny dissolution, merger, or liq-
uidation of a corporation organized under the provisions of said
chapter shall be under the supervision of the commissioner of insur-
ance who shall have all powers with respect thereto granted to the
commissioner under the insurance laws of this state."l59 This lan-
guage does not qualify as a clearly and affirmatively expressed policy
by Iowa to promote monopolization; therefore, the first prong of the
Midcal test was not satisfied. It is impossible to actively supervise a
non-existent policy, so the second prong was not satisfied either.
The state action doctrine did not protect BCBS from a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
b. Availability of McCarran-Ferguson Act Protection
BCBS's alleged monopolization of the health care insurance mar-
ket was not protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Application of
the Pireno factors illustrates that monopolization of a health care in-
surance market is not the "business of insurance."1 60 Monopoliza-
tion of a health care insurance market has no relationship to the
transfer of risk between the insured and the insurer. The risk is
transferred when the contract between the insured and the insurer is
made, and this event is independent of when an insurer may obtain a
monopoly over the market. Monopolization of the health care mar-
ket is not an integral part of the relationship between the insured
and insurer. That relationship is determined by the terms of the
contract, not the percentage of the market controlled by the insurer.
Finally, the monopolization of the health care market by BCBS can
have adverse consequences to entities outside of the insurance in-
dustry, as the discussion in the next section will show. Since the al-
leged monopolization of the health care subscriber market by BCBS
is not the "business of insurance" the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not apply.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite result
because it equated the monopolization claim with the subscriber
contracts.161 This result is not consistent with the Supreme Court's
narrow interpretation of what constitutes the "business of insur-
ance,"' 162 or with the legislative intent of the McCarran-Ferguson
158. See IOWA CODE §§ 514.5-514.8, 514.15-16 (1988).
159. IOWA CODE § 514.14 (1988).
160. The Pireno case is discussed supra in notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
161. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d at 1028.
162. See supra notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
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Act.' 63 By using the "business of insurance" exception to dismiss
the Committee's claim, the court of appeals did not address whether
the Committee's claim constitutes a cause of action. This is the most
interesting issue of the case.
2. The Connection between the Markets
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to acknowledge that
the Committee alleged that its members were injured by BCBS's mo-
nopolization of the health care subscriber contracts. 64 However,
the language of the complaint can easily be construed to include
such an allegation. 165 The Committee alleged that an illegal monop-
oly by BCBS of the health insurance market, coupled with the boy-
cott of chiropractors by BCBS, reduced the number of patients who
sought chiropractic services.' 66 There are two difficulties with this
allegation. First, there is a question of causation. Second, it doesn't
look like a traditional antitrust claim.
The causation issue arises because both the boycott and the mo-
nopolization are necessary for the chiropractors to suffer injury. The
boycott of the chiropractors by BCBS is protected by the state action
doctrine. One could argue that the alleged illegal monopolization of
the health insurance market was not the cause of the chiropractor's
injury. The protected boycott was the cause, therefore the Commit-
tee should not be able to bring the claim against BCBS. However,
the sounder analysis is to recognize that both factors are partial
causes of the chiropractor's injury. The question then becomes
whether or not BCBS should be liable to the Committee when a por-
tion of BCBS's conduct was protected. Since illegal monopolization
is a violation of antitrust law, distinct from boycott activity, it should
create liability for BCBS.
The more difficult hurdle faced by the Committee in bringing this
claim is the novelty of the fact pattern. Because the health care in-
dustry has been conceptualized as including both provider markets
and insurance markets, the Committee is in the unenviable position
of arguing that a monopoly in one market caused injury to another
market. This is not a traditional antitrust claim.' 67 Allowing the
163. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
164. See Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d at 1029 n.ll.
165. See generally supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
166. Individuals who have insurance coverage tend to patronize health care prov-
iders who participate in the same insurance plan. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals should have inferred this, since everything is to be taken in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party in a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Sturm v. Clark,
835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987).
167. This is not a "tying" claim. In tying cases, an entity with monopoly power in
one market uses that power to force consumers to purchase a second product in
another market in order to obtain the first product. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital
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Committee to bring this claim would stretch antitrust law. However,
such a relaxation would probably not create a large amount of addi-
tional antitrust litigation. In order to win the case the Committee
would have to prove BCBS had illegally gained a monopoly in the
health insurance market,' 68 a concrete injury to the chiropractor's
ability to compete in the provider market, and that the injury was
caused by the monopolization by BCBS.
If the facts alleged by the Committee are true, chiropractors' abil-
ity to compete in the health care business has been impaired and
consumers' freedom in choosing health care has been restricted by
BCBS's monopolization. This supports allowing the Committee to
go forward with the claim. In addition, the health care insurance
business is a new arrival in antitrust litigation and the law may need
to evolve further to achieve the objectives of antitrust law in this
area.169 Therefore, the Committee's section 2 claim against BCBS
should not have been dismissed.
CONCLUSION
While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
dismissal of the section 1 Sherman Act claim against BCBS on the
basis of state action doctrine immunity, the dismissal of the section 2
Sherman Act claim was incorrectly affirmed. Health Care Equalization
Comm. of the Iowa Chiropractic Soc'y v. Iowa Medical Soc'y provided the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals with a rare opportunity to lay down
a template for analyzing antitrust violations when there is potential
protection from both the state action doctrine and the McCarran-
v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). BCBS had no product of their own to promote in the
provider market. Therefore, BCBS was not engaged in tying.
168. A monopoly is not illegal unless there is a possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and the acquisition of that power was not a consequence of a
superior product or superior business judgment. A monopoly must have been ob-
tained in a way that harms competition to be illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Grin-
nell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
There are cases which hold that proof of monopoly power, plus proof of exclu-
sion of a competitor without a valid business reason for doing so violates section 2 of
the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985). The Committee could not use this theory because BCBS
had a legitimate business reason for excluding chiropractors from provider con-
tracts-Iowa Code chapter 514 prohibited it.
169. When the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1945, corporations that
were organized for the purpose of providing their members with pre-paid medical
services were not considered to be engaged in the insurance business. See, e.g., Jor-
dan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1939). In less than fifty
years this business has been characterized as the "health care insurance" business
and has been divided into two markets. The "provider market" and "insurance mar-
ket" may not be the best conceptualization of the structure of these corporations.
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Ferguson Act.170 In addition, a new type of antitrust claim was
presented by the Committee. The court did not take advantage of
either opportunity. Some of the issues necessary to the resolution of
the case were not expressly addressed. In addition, assumptions
made by the court, which were critical for understanding its analysis,
were placed in the footnotes of the opinion. This served to compli-
cate, rather than clarify, the difficult issues of antitrust liability.
However, there is merit in the decision of the court of appeals. By
the time the Committee's appeal was before the court, Chapter 514
of the Iowa Code had been amended to include chiropractors as
health care providers.171 Therefore, any monopolization of the
health care insurance market by BCBS should no longer prejudice
the chiropractors. In addition, allowing the Committee to collect
treble damages from BCBS would ultimately mean higher health in-
surance costs to Iowa subscribers, because BCBS is a non-profit or-
ganization. While the chiropractors have a right to recover their
damages, it is inequitable for individual subscribers to bear this cost.
It also seems to run counter to the objectives of antitrust law for
consumers, who have been injured by a violation of antitrust law, to
have to pay damages for that violation.
Dismissal of both the antitrust claims against BCBS may have been
the equitable and judicially efficient way to handle this case. How-
ever, the case sets a murky precedent. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals gave no indication of whether or not the Committee stated a
monopolization claim that could be recognized under antitrust law.
The court's failure to analyze a boycott claim against an insurance
company under both the state action doctrine and the McCarran-
Ferguson Act suggested that an analysis of such a situation is com-
plete after one exemption is found. Such an analysis may result in
missing a conflict between the two exemptions.' 7 2 The determina-
tion that monopolization of an insurance market is equivalent to a
contract between the insurer and the insured, and therefore pro-
tected under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, will undoubtedly cause
problems in the future. Raising the "business of insurance" rule as a
shield precludes investigating the illegality of monopolies obtained
by means other than boycott, intimidation, or coercion. The Eighth
170. There is little case law in this area.
171. See 1986 Iowa Acts Ch. 1180, sec. 2 (1988).
172. As discussed supra note 66, the Supreme Court has not determined the out-
come of this conflict. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act should take priority. Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075, 1079
(4th Cir. 1976). In a footnote of the case discussed in this paper, the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals expressed disagreement with the position of the Fourth Circuit on
this issue. See Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d at 1027 n.10. It would expedite the resolu-
tion of this issue if conflict between the circuits were expressed in a more conspicu-
ous manner.
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Circuit will have to reconsider its analysis if it is faced with a for-
profit insurance company engaged in monopolization of an insur-
ance market.
Mary MaloneyHuss
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